We investigate the productivity effects of innovative employment practices using data from a sample of 36 homogeneous steel production lines owned by 17 companies. The productivity regressions demonstrate that lines using a set of innovative work practices, which include incentive pay, teams, flexible job assignments, employment security, and training, achieve substantially higher levels of productivity than do lines with the more traditional approach, which includes narrow job definitions, strict work rules, and hourly pay with close supervision. Our results are consistent with recent theoretical models which stress the importance of complementarities among work practices. (JEL J24, J5, L20, M11) This study presents new empirical evidence on the productivity effects of alternative employment practices using data that we have assembled on steel finishing processes. The unique data set makes this study's estimates of productivity differentials due to employment practices particularly convincing for several reasons. First, the data set is restricted to observations on one very specific type of manufacturing production process. This narrow focus eliminates many sources of heterogeneity that confound productivity comparisons in more aggregate data and in more heterogeneous samples. Second, we develop a detailed model of this particular production process based on personal visits to each work site. We estimate the productivity model using precise measures of productivity, capital equipment, employment practices, and other line-specific determinants of productivity that we collected from each work site. Third, we obtain longitudinal data on each production line to estimate fixed-effects models that investigate changes in productivity within production lines due to changes in their employment practices. The primary limitation of the study is, of course, that it reflects work practices and performance outcomes in only one industry.
This study presents new empirical evidence on the productivity effects of alternative employment practices using data that we have assembled on steel finishing processes. The unique data set makes this study's estimates of productivity differentials due to employment practices particularly convincing for several reasons. First, the data set is restricted to observations on one very specific type of manufacturing production process. This narrow focus eliminates many sources of heterogeneity that confound productivity comparisons in more aggregate data and in more heterogeneous samples. Second, we develop a detailed model of this particular production process based on personal visits to each work site. We estimate the productivity model using precise measures of productivity, capital equipment, employment practices, and other line-specific determinants of productivity that we collected from each work site. Third, we obtain longitudinal data on each production line to estimate fixed-effects models that investigate changes in productivity within production lines due to changes in their employment practices. The primary limitation of the study is, of course, that it reflects work practices and performance outcomes in only one industry.
We find consistent support for the conclusion that groups or clusters of complementary human resource management (HRM) practices have large effects on productivity, while changes in individual work practices have little or no effect on productivity. In Section I we describe the unique sample and data assembled for this study. Section II identifies studies in the incentive contract literature which stress the importance of complementarities among employment practices, while Section III develops measures of the production lines' HRM practices. In Sections IV-VI we present alternative econometric specifications of the productivity model and the empirical estimates. Section VII offers a conclusion.
I. Sample and Data

A. Sample Design
Heterogeneity in production processes and outputs often limits the persuasiveness of empirical studies that make firm-level or plantlevel productivity comparisons. Therefore, in designing our model of worker productivity, we sought to minimize heterogeneity by collecting a unique data set on a sample of steelmaking operations. Observations in the sample are not of steel companies, divisions of steel companies, or even steel mills. Rather, the sample consists of observations on one very specific type of steel finishing process.
Of the approximately 60 finishing lines of this type in the United States, we personally visited 45 lines owned by 21 companies at locations ranging from New York to Alabama to California. We conducted field interviews for one to three days at each site, collecting information on HRM practices, the performance of the finishing lines, the capital equipment used in the production processes, other inputs into the production process, and wage data. Four of the 45 lines could not provide performance data because they had been operating for only a few months. Of the remaining 41 lines, 36 lines provided comparable monthly productivity data. This study's econometric analysis uses a panel data set of up to 2,190 monthly observations on the productivity of these 36 steel finishing lines owned by 17 different steel companies. The sample includes multiple lines for major steel producers as well as lines for smaller companies that operate only one or two lines. The sample contains unionized lines as well as nonunion lines. According to company and industry sources, the sample includes high and low performers and a wide range of HRM environments.
B. The Production Process and the Dependent Productivity Variable
To understand how to model the production process in these finishing lines and how to measure the lines' performance, we toured each line with an experienced engineer, area operations manager, or superintendent. The basic production process is very similar in all lines. Steel input on each line is a roll (or coil) of flat-rolled steel weighing about 12 tons. The coil is loaded at the beginning of the line where the steel strip is welded to the end of the previous coil on the line. The coil then is unrolled so that a long, continuous sheet of steel threads its way through the machinery that treats the steel. After the finishing treatment, the steel strip is then re-coiled and cut at the exit end of the process. The line can operate continuously around the clock as coils are welded to one another.
The productivity model for this production process is best understood within the context of an "engineering production function." The tonnage that comes off the line per month (Q) is a function of the tonnage loaded onto the line-and therefore is a function of the width (w) and thickness or gauge (g) of the steel strip-times the speed of the line (s), and the hours it is running (h). If hS represents the maximum hours the line is scheduled to run, then the potential steel output on line i in month t is arithmetically determined by the four key technical parameters (w, g, s, and hs), and this can be expressed:
(1) Potential Qit = (wit,git,sit,W)
where the quantity in parentheses in equation (1 ) is the volume of steel through line i in month t, and w is an estimate of the density of steel. Since the production parameters in equation ( 1 ) are determined by the technical specifications of the line's equipment and the specifications of the input coil's width and gauge, a line's production in any month depends only on the number of hours the line actually runs:
(2) Actual Qit = ( wit * git * Sit * h sit x (1-dit), where dit is delays-the fraction of total scheduled hours that are lost because of unscheduled line stops. Once the technological parameters and product mix are specified, production depends solely on delays. Productivity improves by increasing uptime, (1 -dit).
Production-line uptime is our primary measure of productivity, because uptime directly determines steel output and because uptime figures are especially comparable across companies. Uptime, Ui, = 1 -di,, is the percent of scheduled operating time that the line actually runs. In the sample of 2,190 "line-month" observations used in the empirical analysis, uptime has a mean value of 0.919, a standard deviation of 0.044, and a range of 0.398 to 0.996. In addition to this output measure, we will provide results for the quality of output, as measured by the percent of tons produced that meet specific quality standards for the industry. We focus primarily, however, on productivity.
C. Control Variables in the Productivity Equation
This study's focus on one specific production process eliminates many sources of heterogeneity in productivity, but these production lines are not identical. To provide a thorough set of controls for other sources of productivity variation, we personally inspected each production line in the sample and discussed with engineering experts from the lines any technical features that affect uptime. Based on these discussions, we were able to identify and collect a comprehensive set of data on technological features of the lines that affect their productivity.
The uptime productivity equations include up to 25 controls for detailed features of the line that affect uptime. These are controls for capital vintage (the year the line was built and its square); "learning curve" effects (time since start-up of the line and its square, a dummy for the first year of operations, and a monthly time counter for the start-up period); technical line specifications (line width, line speed, and their squares); specific line machinery that reduces or increases the likelihood of unscheduled downtime (a dummy for the degree of computerization on the line and nine dummies for specific design features of equipment); periods of unusually high downtime (variables for quarters when new equipment is added to the line); the quality of steel input (a ranking of steel quality from potential U.S. suppliers); and the extent of scheduled downtime for maintenance activities (the number of annual eight-hour maintenance shifts). According to our interviews and site inspections, unscheduled downtime should be higher in older lines, faster and wider lines, start-up periods, lines with fewer computerized controls, periods when new equipment is installed, lines that perform less preventive maintenance, and lines with lower quality steel input.
D. Data on HRM Policies
We gathered human resource management data by conducting standardized interviews with HR managers, labor relations managers, operations managers of the finishing lines, superintendents, line workers, and union representatives in organized lines. We collected supporting information from personnel files, personnel manuals, collective bargaining agreements, and other primary source documents. We used this information from the interviews and supporting documents to answer survey-type questions about the HRM practices and then to construct a detailed set of HRM dummy variables. Table 1 provides the definitions of a subset of representative HRM variables and their mean values for the panel data set. These variables measure work practices in all major areas of personnel management, including compensation, recruiting and selection, team-based work organization, employment security, flexible job assignment, skills training, and communication procedures. We also include two traditional labor relations indicators: the union status of the line and a grievance rate variable.
II. Complementarities Among Work Practices
Several empirical studies have examined the effects on a firm's productivity of individual work practices such as those listed in Table 1 According to these theories, interaction effects among HRM policies are important determinants of productivity. Firms realize the largest gains in productivity by adopting clusters of complementary practices, and benefit little from making "marginal" changes in any one HRM practice. These theories also identify complementarities among specific practices which span seven different HRM policy areas: incentive compensation plans, extensive recruiting and selection, work teams, employment security, flexible job assignment, skills training, and labor-management communication.' Taken as a whole, these theories also predict that adopting this entire complement of practices across all seven HRM policy areas will produce the highest levels of productivity.2
If firms adopt work practices in a complementary fashion, then empirical tests should consider the impacts of groups of practices rather than simply the effects of individual practices. The primary hypothesis investigated in the empirical work is: do groups of innovative HRM practices increase productivity? The productivity effects of groups of innovative work practices also will be compared to the effects of differences in individual work practices.
III. HRM Systems
The argument that complementarities exist among HRM practices is consistent with the evidence that HRM policy variables are highly correlated with each other in our steel sample. Out of 78 possible bivariate correlations among the 13 HRM variables listed in Table  1 This high degree of intercorrelation among HRM practices indicates that empirical models that estimate the impact of any one HRM practice on productivity will yield biased coefficients due to the omission of other HRM practices with which the one included practice is correlated. One possible solution to this omitted variable problem would be to enter the entire set of potentially important HRM variables into the productivity equations. This approach, however, is confounded by the severe collinearity among the HRM practices, making any one coefficient uninterpretable, and would not directly test whether combinations of HRM practices are the critical determinants of productivity.5 To examine the importance of sets of highly correlated, and presumably complementary, HRM practices, one must examine the effects of interactions among the practices. There are an insufficient number of degrees of freedom to test a full set of interaction terms among all available HRM practice variables. And, an expansive set of interaction terms still would be confounded by collinearity among practices, so we seek to identify common clusters of practices.
A. Identifying Systems of HRM Practices
To summarize the overall HRM environments of the work sites in our sample, we identify the most common combinations of HRM practices in these production lines. Specifically, we examine an extensive set of variables that describe the seven HRM policy areas considered in the theories discussed in Section II: subjective and objective incentive compensation plans, extensive recruiting and selection, teamwork, employment security, job flexibility, training, and labor-management communication.6 Combinations of practices that exist in our sample are referred to as "HRM systems." with this system have close supervision by foremen; strict work rules and narrow job responsibilities; incentive pay based on quantity of output and not quality of output; no work teams; no practice of managers sharing financial information or meeting regularly off-line with workers; no screening; and no off-line or other formal training. * HRM System 3 is similar to the System 4, except that these lines have introduced innovative practices in two specific areas. They have initiated worker involvement in teams (though few have a high level of involvement) and they have enhanced their labor-management communication practices, either by sharing financial information or through regular meetings between line managers and workers or their union representatives.
* HRM System 2 incorporates the information-sharing and work team practices associated with HRM System 3, but these lines also include two other innovative practicesextensive skills training and high levels of worker involvement in teams. While they may add one or two other innovative work practices, these lines always lack one or more of the following practices: extensive screening, job rotation or reduced job classifications, multiattribute incentive pay, or employment security.7 * HRM System 1 incorporates innovative HRM practices in all HRM policy areas. Lines with this system have a multiattribute incentive pay plan or a "pay-for-knowledge" incentive pay system; extensive screening of new workers, often lasting over one year; off-line training in technical skills and team problem solving; high levels of employee involvement in multiple problem-solving teams; job duties covering a wide range of tasks with workers often rotating across jobs; regular information sharing between workers and management; and an implicit employment security pledge.
In addition to identifying the common HRM systems by inspecting the distribution of HRM dummy variables in the sample, we also use three statistical procedures to identify common HRM systems. The alternative statistical classification procedures produce system classifications that overlap very closely with those system classifications described above, suggesting that the classification of lines' HRM environments is robust with respect to different classification procedures.8 We will use the "systems" reported in Table 2 as the basic HRM measures in the productivity regressions, but also present regression results introducing HRM systems from one of the alternative classification procedures to illustrate the similarity of the results when HRM systems are measured with a different procedure.
B. The Distribution and Average
Productivities of HRM Systems Table 3 shows the distribution of the data and productivity means for the alternative HRM systems. While most lines do not change their HRM systems during the data period, 13.8 percent of the sample's 2,190 observations are from lines that change their HRM systems, moving from the more traditional Systems 4 and 3 to more innovative systems. However, no line adopted enough innovative practices to switch into HRM System 1. All HRM System 1 lines are new lines that began operations with the full complement of innovative practices listed in Table 2. No lines adopted less innovative systems. Table 3 presents mean uptimes for lines with different HRM systems, differentiating between the uptime levels of "stayers" and "changers." The numbers along the diagonal of Table 3 show average uptimes for the "stayers," or for lines that did not change their HRM systems. According to the figures along the diagonal, these cross-sectional comparisons show productivity differentials relative to traditional HRM System 4 of 3.1 percentage points for HRM System 3; 2.5 percentage points for HRM System 2; and 4.1 percentage points for HRM System 1. The numbers in the area above the diagonal in Table 3 show uptime levels for "changers" before and after the adoption of more innovative HRM systems. The average longitudinal uptime gains for lines adopting more innovative systems of HRM practices range from 1 to 2.5 percentage points. 7 A small number of lines have either high participation in teams or extensive training, but not both policies together. We classify these lines as HRM System 2 or 3, depending on how extensive the HRM practices in the other policy areas are. Our empirical results are virtually unaffected by how we categorize these few "intermediate" cases. 8 Because HRM systems follow a hierarchy from a set of very traditional to more innovative practices, we use three scaling algorithms that create a single HRM "innovativeness" index. Two of these three scaling procedures, Nominate scaling and Guttman 'scaling, are described in Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal ( Table 4 . 
IV. Econometric Specifications and Estimates
The uptime data displayed in Table 3 indicate that lines that upgrade their HRM system improve their uptime performance by 1 to 2 percentage points. These mean differences do not, however, control for many other factors that can affect uptime gains, and they do not compare the uptime gains for HRM "changers" to the uptime gains for those lines that did not change their HRM practices.9 Furthermore, focusing exclusively on the uptime gains for changers makes no use of the information contained in the cross-sectional variation in uptime and HRM practices across lines. The primary objective of the econometric analysis below is to make the best use of both types of information-of the longitudinal and cross-sectional differences in uptime-and to compare the alternative longitudinal and cross-sectional estimators of the productivity effects of HRM policies. 9 A comparison of the growth in uptime for HRM "changers" versus HRM "stayers" would correspond to the use of the "difference-in-differences" estimator used in program evaluation studies (Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, 1985; Robert J. LaLonde, 1986). Rather than present results using this estimator, we move directly to the fixed-effects estimator in Table 4 , which is equivalent to difference-in-differences with added control variables. The significance of the control variables makes fixedeffects estimation more illuminating, and fixed-effects estimation is more readily applied to unbalanced monthly panel data. To estimate the effects of HRM practices or systems of HRM practices on the uptime productivity measure, we begin with the following simple model of a line's uptime: (3) Ui = y'Hit + 3'Xit + eit.
The determinants of productivity in (3) include dummy variables for the HRM systems (Hit); line characteristics (Xi,), such as the technological features of the production process; and an error term that is temporarily assumed to be independently and identically distributed.
A. The Productivity Effects of Alternative HRM Systems Table 4 contains the estimates of equation (3), introducing first a limited set and then an extensive set of technology controls to assess the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications. Columns ( la) -( lb) of Table 4 report estimates of the effects of HRM systems in a model with a basic set of controls for technological determinants of line uptime. Results in column (la) use the HRM classifications shown in Table 2 to identify the HRM systems, while those in column (lb) use the alternative Nominate statistical classification procedure to identify the HRM systems (see footnote 8). Columns (2a) and (2b) also report results for the two alternative HRM system definitions, but these specifications now introduce all 25 controls for differences in technology and other inputs.
These regression results reveal a hierarchical pattern in the productivity differentials of HRM systems: lines with HRM System 1 have the highest productivity, followed in order by lines with HRM Systems 2, 3, and 4. F-tests reveal that the difference between the coefficients on HRM Systems 1 and 2 and the difference between the coefficients on HRM Systems 2 and 3 are both significant at the 0.01 level in all models. The estimates of the productivity effects of HRM systems are very similar in the alternative specifications, although the addition of the detailed technology controls reduces the estimated impact of alternative HRM System 1 by some 3 percentage points.
B. Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Productivity Effects of Alternative HRM Systems
In estimating the impact of HRM systems on productivity, we want to avoid any possible selection bias arising from nonrandom selection of HRM practices. The ideal data set would be experimental data in which the selection of HRM practices is made randomly. However, without an experimental design that ensures random assignment, we must use our nonexperimental data to mimic the desired experimental comparison. In this section we present fixed-effects estimates in light of our concern with nonrandom selection issues.
The most likely reason for the nonrandom assignment of the innovative HRM practices versus the less innovative practices is that "high-quality" lines choose the most innovative practices. Thus, we introduce an unobserved line-specific quality variable, ai, in our uptime regression.
(4) Uit = r'Hit + f3'Xit + ai + sit. The fixed-effects results in column (3) of Table 4 eliminate the impact of all fixed linespecific effects (ai ) and also introduce controls for any time-varying productivity determinants that were included in the column (2) models. These results document positive effects from introducing more innovative HRM practices: relative to traditional System 4, lines adopting the System 2 set of practices gain 3.5 percentage points of uptime, and lines adopting System 3 practices gain 2.5 percentage points of uptime.'0
C. A Comparison of Fixed-Effects and
Cross-Sectional Estimators
The advantage of fixed-effects estimation is that it controls for any selection bias that would result if different quality lines adopt different HRM practices. The disadvantage of fixed-effects estimation is that it uses only the information from HRM "changers" in estimating the effects of HRM practices. All cross-sectional information is eliminated in the estimation. Recognizing that the information from HRM changers is limited because HRM changes are not common events, the data-collection protocol for this study was developed to obtain convincing crosssectional productivity comparisons. First, we selected a specific production line that would be comparable across different companies. Second, during plant visits we reviewed features of each line with experienced engineers to identify technical sources of productivity variation. Finally, we collected the detailed vector of control variables described in Section I to account for the identifiable sources of productivity variation. If this vector of productivity controls, Xi,, successfully controls for the line-specific sources of productivity variation that are correlated with HRM choice, then the estimates of y will not be biased by the omission of ai in equation (3), and the coefficients in the fixed-effects results should be comparable to those in the cross-sectional results containing detailed capital controls.
The estimated productivity effects of HRM system variables in the fixed-effects model are virtually identical to those in the column (2b) specifications containing the detailed Xi, controls. In particular, t-tests cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the HRM Systems 2 and 3 variables in the fixed-effects model are equal to the corresponding coefficients in the column (2b) model (see footnote 11). As shown in Table 3 , no production line switches into HRM System 1, so the column (3) fixed-effects model contains no estimate of the effects of HRM System 1.
Additional specification tests provide further evidence that the column (2) OLS models already contain a thorough set of controls that adjust for line-specific determinants of productivity. Not only are the coefficients on the HRM system variables very similar between the fixed-effects and OLS specifications, but the coefficients on the control variables also are nearly equivalent between these two specifications." The Appendix Table Al Table 4 were reestimated allowing for firstorder serial correlation, the estimated standard errors increased only slightly. The magnitudes and levels of significance of all estimated effects of the HRM system variables virtually are identical to those presented in Table 4 .15
E. The Magnitudes of the Estimated Productivity Effects of HRM Systems
The magnitudes of the estimated effects of HRM systems on uptime are quite consistent across specifications in Table 4 . The baseline fixed-effects model in column (3) reports uptime differentials of 2.5 percentage points for HRM System 3 and 3.5 percentage points for HRM System 2, and the estimates from the OLS models with detailed technology controls in column (2) are insignificantly different from these fixed-effects estimates. While fixed-effects estimates for the productivity differentials for HRM System 1 could not be calculated, the most conservative estimate of the productivity differential for HRM System 1 in any OLS model in Table 4 is 6.7 percentage points. Are uptime differentials of this magnitude economically important?
Using cost data from one small-scale line, we calculate that a conservative estimate of the effect of a 1-percentage-point increase in uptime on revenues net of any differences in production cost and any differences in the direct costs of the HRM policies would be approximately $27,900 per month.'6 Using this value, estimates will not be biased by differences in uptime growth even with serial correlation in the errors (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985 p. 652). We reestimate the model deleting observations for one or two quarters before and after any changes in HRM systems, and the results virtually are the same as those reported in column (3) of Table 4 . We suspect that changes in uptime over such short periods would not cause management to adopt new work policies, so we focus on the possibility of longerterm declines in productivity growth.
" We find evidence of a very modest three-month lag in the OLS and fixed-effects uptime models. For example, when the fixed-effects uptime regression [ ' 5A further consideration in estimating the productivity models is that the percent uptime variable is bounded by zero and one, suggesting the possibility of Tobit estimation. We do not pursue Tobit estimation for the fixedeffects models because the coefficient estimates of fixedeffects Tobit models are not consistent: the nonlinearity of the Tobit model introduces an incidental parameters problem. However, when the OLS models are estimated as a Tobit with a mass point at one, the estimated coefficients essentially are the same as the OLS estimates presented in Table 4 . Note that no lines have uptimes at the mass point of one. A double-sided Tobit with a second mass point at zero is unnecessary since no lines have uptimes close to zero. 16 During a delay, a line loses revenue from planned output, incurs fixed costs (which exceed $5000 per hour in some lines) and some "variable" costs such as labor costs, but saves on other variable costs such as the costs of steel and energy inputs. Using a conservative estimate of the profit margin on a ton of steel and liberal estimates of the costs that would not be incurred during a delay, we calculate an increase of $30,000 per month in operating income from a 1-percent increase in uptime. We then subtract $2,100 from this figure for the costs of the new HRM policies. We calculate this estimate by using information from interviews to compare the costs of policies in HRM System 1 and HRM System 4. Higher costs of HRM System 1 are due to the time production workers must meet off the line, additional HRM staff, consultants for ongoing training and team organization, certain fixed costs of we conservatively estimate that when one line in our sample changed from HRM System 4 to HRM System 2 and maintained these changes for ten years, it increased its operating profits by well over $10 million dollars strictly as a result of the HRM changes."7
V. Alternative Explanations
The regression coefficients displayed in Table 4 imply that introducing innovative HIRM systems increases workers' productivity. However, other factors that change over time within lines, such as changes in plant management or threats of job loss, could be the true cause of the productivity increases. In this section, we estimate alternative specifications that consider these factors.
A. Management Quality
If better managers are more likely to adopt innovative FIRM systems and to adopt other productivity-enhancing practices at the same time, the estimated HRM effects will suffer from omitted variable bias. We collected additional data to provide two tests of this hypothesis. First, we reestimate the fixed-effects model in Table 4 , column (3), and include several standard measures of managerial quality-the tenure of the line manager, the tenure of the site's HR manager, and the squares of these tenure variables. We also include two dummies for whether the line has a new line manager or a new HR manager, because the estimated effects of switching HRM systems may only reflect the effects of newly hired managers who change HRM policies upon their arrival. The inclusion of these variables [ Table 5 , column (2)] produces virtually no change in the estimated HRM system coefficients relative to our base-model estimates [ Table 5 , column ( 1 )]. Though only the fixedeffects results are reported in Table 5 , results for the OLS model with detailed controls are essentially equivalent to these results for all specifications displayed in Table 5 .
These measures of managerial quality may be incomplete if, for example, "good" managers adopt innovative HRM practices and also make other changes to achieve superior productivity. We therefore include in the fixed-effects model 72 person-specific management dummies-one dummy for each period that a line's operations manager and HR manager remained unchanged. As shown in column (3) of Table 5 , the inclusion of this vector of person-specific management dummies increases the estimated effects of HRM Systems 2 and 3 compared to the estimates from the baseline fixed-effects model in column (1) of Table 5 . Overall, the results indicate that the effects of the HRM system variables are independent of any managerial behaviors or philosophies that are specific to any individual manager. While higher-quality managers may eventually choose to adopt innovative HRM practices, the productivity effects that arise are from the changes in the practices, not from the inherent quality of the manager.
B. Threat Effects
Some lines may face serious threats of layoffs and plant shutdowns, and these threats developing these policies, and costs of employment security for wages paid for idle time (assuming that a line would be idle for two months every four years). We allow HRM System 1 to save on the salary of one foreman. Assuming a relatively short time horizon of five years for amortizing fixed costs, the monthly difference in costs between HRM Systems 4 and 1 is about $2,100 per percentage-point gain in uptime. The $27,900 estimate of the monthly revenue increase net of the costs of HRM policies probably is an underestimate because larger-scale lines will have bigger revenue effects, and increases in output quality (discussed in Section V below) yield further revenue increases.
17 Uptime at this line was consistently some 8 percentage points higher after the change in HRM systems. The Table 4 , column (3), fixed-effects model indicates that 3.5 percentage points of this gain can be attributed to the new HRM practices themselves. Uptime also increased at this line because it began using higher quality steel input near the time of the HRM changes (see Appendix Table Al, Table 5 . While threat effects may have helped convince labor and management at certain sites to agree to new work practices, these threat variables do not account for the estimated effects of HRM practices on productivity for several reasons. First, not all threatened lines changed their HRM practices, so threat alone cannot explain HRM effects. Second, even in lines where threats of closure occurred along with the changes in HRM practices, these lines have sustained increases in uptime long after the threat of closure has dissipated. Third, innovative HRM practices are widely adopted by new lines that have no threat of closure, and the practices are associated with success in these lines as well.
C. Worker's Pay
Another possibility is that workers in lines with the more innovative HRM systems may be working more productively because they are paid more. To test this hypothesis, we collected wage data from company records and from union contracts (1989 to-1993) and coupled these data with interview information to estimate average pay rates.'8 When we include wage rate data, the sample size falls to 863, since the sample is limited to recent time periods. The uptime model is reestimated for this sample with and without the average wage of production workers. The coefficient on the average wage is insignificant in all OLS and fixed-effects models and, therefore, there are no changes in the coefficients on the HRM variables when the wage variable is introduced.'9 Factors that are exogenous to the current productivity of the finishing lines determine wages.20
D. Other Time-Varying Determinants of Productivity
Finally, we reestimate the fixed-effects specification including a set of year dummies that may be correlated with any omitted timevarying determinants of productivity. Table 5 , column (5), reports results from this model. Although the year dummies show a pattern of increasing productivity over time, the effects of HRM System 2 and HRM System 3 are again almost identical to the corresponding coefficients in the baseline fixed-effects specification in column (1). Column (6) reports estimated coefficients on the HRM system variables when the fixed-effect model includes year dummies and controls for all other timevarying variables considered in Table 5 . The estimated coefficients for the HRM Systems 2 and 3 variables now are somewhat larger than they were in the baseline fixed-effects model of column (1).
In sum, the Table 5 results do not provide any evidence that the coefficients on HRM system variables are biased upward by omitted line-specific or time-varying factors.
E. Effects of HRM Systems on Product Quality
The evidence shows positive significant effects of HRM systems, but the value of these productivity effects will be diminished if they are achieved at the expense of reductions in the quality of output. We collected data on output quality as measured by the lines' monthly "prime-yield" rates -the percent of total production that met the standards for designation as "prime" finished steel. With these data, we are able to test whether the uptime gains reported in Tables 4 and 5 are offset by any decreases in the quality of steel production under the more innovative HRM systems. Table 6 presents estimates of the effects of HRM systems on prime-yield rates21 in mod- 18 The average wage data for production workers include incentive pay, overtime pay, shift pay, and profit sharing. When these averages were not available for the production line, we used the union labor contracts to predict average wages, combined with interview information on the average grade level, average amount of overtime, and average incentive pay percentages (including profit sharing). Only two lines were unable to provide data for the calculation of average wages. Fringe benefit compensation is omitted, and though it is slightly higher in unionized lines than nonunion lines due to higher pensions and days off, this omission does not appear to affect the results. First, wages continue to be insignificant determinants of uptime when the sample is restricted to unionized lines. Second, union-nonunion differences in fringe benefits do not change with the timing of "HRM changers," and wages continue to have no effects on uptime in fixedeffects models. 19 The coefficients (standard errors) on the wage variable are 0.00016 (0.00079) for the OLS model with detailed controls and 0.00168 (0.00172) for the fixed-effects model. The coefficients on the HRM variables for the subsample having wage data (N = 863) are slightly smaller in magnitude than in the full sample, but they remain significantly different from zero. These results are unchanged when real wages replace nominal wages. 20 Insignificant wage effects are not surprising. First, wage variation in the sample is small. Second, wage changes typically occur when national labor agreements are renegotiated, and these periods do not coincide with systematic changes in productivity. Third, wage changes also do not coincide with changes in HRM systems, so inclusion of the wage variable does not affect the estimated effects of HRM systems in fixed-effects uptime models.
2' Because total steel production is the denominator of the prime-yield rate variable, these estimates are not affected by any effects of the HRM system variables on production and line delays. Tables 4 and 5 is evident in the prime-yield models in Table 6 . Lines with HRM System 1 have prime-yield rates that considerably exceed the yields of lines with other HRM systems. HRM Systems 2 and 3 produce comparable gains in prime-yield rates relative to HRM System 4. Fixed-effects results also demonstrate higher yield rates under more innovative HRM practices.23 22 To account for slight differences in the way prime yield is measured from line to line, we include in the prime-yield regressions additional controls not included in the uptime regressions. Prime-yield models in Table 6 include four dummy variables for the five slightly different ways that prime yield is calculated at different lines. For example, prime steel production might be expressed as a percentage of total tons of steel at the exit end of the finishing line or as a percentage of total tons of steel input on the entry end of the line. These dummy variables in OLS specifications are consistently significant with the expected signs given the differences in the definitions. The definitions the lines used to calculate prime yield do not change over time, and so these variables drop out of the fixed-effects models. 23 The prime-yield regressions in OLS and fixed-effects models were reestimated with corrections for first-order serial correlation. Standard errors in these models were only slightly larger than those in the Table 6 models. Magnitudes and levels of significance of HRM system coefficients are very similar to those reported in Table 6. F. Why Don't All Lines Have the HighProductivity HRM Systems?
Based on the relative stability of the coefficients in the productivity regressions in Tables  4 and 5 , we conclude that the estimated productivity effects of innovative HIRM systems are largely independent of the adoption propensity. However, this conclusion would even be more persuasive if we could identify likely reasons why some lines adopt the productivityenhancing HRM systems and others do not.
There are two obvious explanations for the limited adoption: (1) managers have had only limited knowledge about the performance effects of IIRM systems; and (2) nonpecuniary barriers to change beyond the direct costs of the work practices limit adoption in certain lines. During our fieldwork at the finishing lines, we found support for both of these explanations.
When most steel mills were built, innovative practices were not in use. However, recently opened lines at "greenfield" sites, as well as older lines that had been closed but were opened with new owners and workers, are adopting innovative work practices. Knowledge about the potential productivity gains of innovative practices can be considered to be analogous to knowledge about the effects of a technological innovation. While mills at many companies now have some experience with new work practices, many mills still have not adopted the productivity-improving innovation. In particular, continuously operating lines at "brownfield" sites are still much more likely to have traditional HIRM practices.
Our field interviews revealed two sets of reasons for the resistance to the new practices in the older lines despite the growing knowledge about the productivity benefits of new work practices. First, managers and production workers at these sites have irivested in skills and work relationships that would have to change substantially if new HRM systems were adopted. These costs of changing HRM practices do not exist in new lines or in old lines that are reopened by new owners.24 Second, the old continuously operating lines are marked by greater mistrust between labor and management, and these lines must overcome this mistrust before the new work practices can be effective.25 The very fact that all of our "greenfield" lines adopted innovative practices suggests that it is the transition costs of adoption that have limited adoption rates.
Different rates of adoption across lines, therefore, are a function of differences in these nonpecuniary costs of adoption that affect the profitability of the practices, and not differences in expected productivity gains. In some older lines, new managers or certain workers can champion the new work practices and overcome these impediments to change. In others, credible threats of plant closure motivate existing workers and managers to adopt more productive work arrangements. At the same time, factors like threat effects or workers who champion new practices do not appear to be systematic determinants of the productivity effects of innovative FIRM practices. When old lines do overcome these nonpecuniary costs of switching policies, they experience significant productivity gains from the innovative policies. The variation across lines and within lines over time in these nonpecuniary costs of adopting new work practices 24 At the same time, the age and older technology of these lines are not responsible for the limited adoption of new work practices. Detailed controls in the productivity models for capital vintage do not eliminate the productivity effects of HRM systems for several reasons. When older lines in the sample were shut down and later reopened by new owners, all adopted many new work practices. And, as illustrated by the results of the fixed-effects models, some continuously operating older lines adopted new HRM systems that raised their productivity.
25 Labor-management trust is needed for many innovative HRM practices to be effective (Baker et al., 1994) . Our interviews revealed how a low level of labormanagement trust in older lines rendered ineffective new work practices like information sharing, productivityimprovement teams, and employment security. For example, the manager at one older line observed: "It's just difficult to change attitudes in old plants with a history of tension and mistrust. We now share financial information with workers, but some workers still believe there are two sets of books." At another line, a supervisor stated: "Workers out here don't believe that they have employment security ... Since employment security is only a contractual guarantee, they know that it may very well go away in the next [union] contract." allows us to observe the different work practices in this technologically homogeneous sample, and thus to estimate the impact of alternative HRM practices on productivity.
VI. Productivity Effects of Individual HRM Practices
Tables 4-6 show significant positive effects of innovative systems of HRM practices on productivity and product quality. These models do not, however, compare the effects of individual HRM practices to those of systems of practices and, therefore, do not provide evidence on whether the individual work practices that comprise an HRM system are complementary. Complementarity among work practices implies that the magnitude of the productivity effect of the system of HRM policies is larger than the sum of the marginal effects from adopting each practice.
In Table 7 we compare the productivity effects of HRM systems with the productivity effects of individual work practices. When variables for individual HRM practices are added to the regressions containing HRM system dummies, the individual practices have no additional impact on productivity. In other words, the HRM system dummies capture the full productivity impact of the lines' HRM environments; the estimated effect of any individual HRM practice essentially is zero. Specifically, columns ( la) -( id) show results from 15 separate productivity models that are the same as the OLS model in Table 4, Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 report results from productivity models that introduce only the individual HRM practices without the HRM system variables. The coefficients on the individual practice variables in the OLS and fixed-effects models without the HRM system dummies are positive and significant with magnitudes ranging from about 1 to 3 percentage points.28 A comparison of the OLS coefficients in column ( id) with those in column (3) and a comparison of the fixed-effects coefficients in column (2c) with those in column (4) show that the effects of the individual HRM practices in models without the HRM system dummies disappear once the HRM sys-26 All OLS and fixed-effects models in Table 7 were reestimated with corrections for first-order serial correlation. Again, the magnitudes of all coefficients virtually are unaffected by this correction. Standard errors for some coefficients increase, but only slightly. The significance levels of all HRM coefficients are similar in all cases to those shown in Table 7 . 27 While the work practices employed by lines with a given HRM system are highly similar, some work practices do vary within HRM System 3 lines and within the HRM System 2 lines (see Table 2 ). Furthermore, in addition to the lines that changed enough practices to "switch systems" (see Table 3 ), other lines change individual HRM policies during the data period. The coefficients on the variables which measure individual HRM practices in the OLS estimates shown in column (Id) are positive and significant in only two cases (profit sharing in line 1 and low train in line 10), where the effects still are very modest. As in Table 4 , the HRM System 1 variable could not be included in fixed-effects models since no line switched into this category with the most innovative HRM practices. Also, some fixed-effects models of the effects of individual HRM practices could not be estimated because certain individual HRM policies do not change in any lines in the sample period. In the fixedeffects models which include the HRM system variables [columns (2a) -(2c)], the only coefficient which is significantly positive for an individual HRM variable is the coefficient on the low grievance variable (line 15), suggesting that productivity-enhancing changes in HRM systems are accompanied by a movement to an environment with little grievance activity, consistent with studies that have found an inverse relationship between grievance activity and productivity (Ichniowski, 1986) . 28 Fixed-effects models which include the multiple teams (line 6) and information-sharing (line 11 ) variables could be estimated in column (4) models without the HRM system dummies because these variables change over time within some lines. However, within-line changes in these two variables are collinear with switches between certain HRM systems, and so the two corresponding fixed-effects models in columns (2a) -(2c) could not be estimated. Table 4, The evidence shows that systems of HRM practices determine productivity and quality, while marginal changes in individual work practices have little effect. The preponderance of evidence in this study also is consistent with the conclusion that complementarities among innovative work practices are important. Note first that the positive correlations among innovative HRM practices show that firms are likely to select multiple innovative practices rather than single practices, suggestive of complementarities among policies. Second, the productivity regressions reenforce the view that complementarities are important, even though the collinearity among practices inherently limits our ability to distinguish between the impact of individual practices and the impact of systems of practices. HRM system variables are shown to raise productivity substantially, and the effects of these system variables exceed the effects of the full set of individual practices. Third, in extensive interviews during our plant visits, operations managers offered numerous explanations as to why practices that are introduced in isolation have little effect on performance (Ichniowski et al., 1995 pp. 36-37). Finally, as described in Section V, subsection F, growing knowledge of the effectiveness of sets of innovative work practices has led steel companies to adopt these practices in all "greenfield" sites, while high transition costs of adopting entirely new systems of work practices have slowed their introduction at "brownfield" sites.
VII. Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence on the productivity effects of employment practices. The evidence, derived from unique monthly panel data on productivity and HRM practices in a homogeneous sample of production lines, shows that innovative HRM practices raise worker productivity. Moreover, systems of innovative HRM practices have large effects on production workers' performance, while changes in individual employment practices have little or no effect. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that, in these steel finishing lines, innovative employment practices tend to be complements, as is proposed in the recent theoretical work on optimal incentive structures. That is, workers' performance is substantially better under incentive pay plans that are coupled with supporting innovative 29 The estimated negative coefficient on union status in the OLS model without the HRM system dummies [ Table  7 , column (3), line 14] also reflects the more complex dynamics of how systems of HRM policies determine productivity. On average, union lines are less productive than nonunion lines in our sample. But not all union lines are less productive than the nonunion lines in the sample. The negative union coefficient in Table 7 , column (3), line 14, reflects the fact that a large number of union lines have the low productivity practices of HRM Systems 3 and 4, even though the lines in the most productive HRM System 1 are unionized lines. Once the productivity models control for the effect of HRM systems in columns ( la) -( ld), the union productivity effect becomes insignificant.
work practices-such as flexible job design, employee participation in problem-solving teams, training to provide workers with multiple skills, extensive screening and communication, and employment security-than it is under more traditional work practices. 
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